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April 1, 2003 
Tensions surrounding North Korea escalate unpredictably on an almost daily basis. Much of this 
volatile situation can be ascribed to Pyongyang's willingness to engage in a reckless combination 
of provocative acts and rhetorical tirades that constitute its infamous diplomatic brinkmanship. 
North Korea's willingness to make use of its nuclear option in a U.S.-DPRK diplomatic meeting 
last October seems to have been motivated by a desire to reinforce its peculiar brand of 
deterrence. The Kim Jong-il government was further emboldened in subsequent months by the 
combination of two sets of circumstances. First were favorable political developments in South 
Korea—in the form of December's election of President Roh Moo-hyun, who strongly favors ROK 
engagement of the DPRK and took office riding a wave of strident anti-Americanism. The second 
were the United States' commitments within its war on terrorism and related tensions in the 
Middle East that stretched U.S. strategic resources. Against this background North Korea saw an 
opportunity. 
Pyongyang proceeded to do its utmost to make the international community, with the United 
States as the sole superpower, pay more attention to North Korea's dire economic straits by 
taking its geopolitical posture more seriously. It has been in bad shape for years, causing many 
foreign observers to anticipate its collapse—even as more hopeful South Koreans viewed these 
conditions as an opportunity to reach out to their fellow Koreans in an attempt to induce inter-
Korean reconciliation through the provision of economic assistance that would, in turn, lead to the 
transformation of Pyongyang's policies. Despite some sporadic accomplishments, not much of 
genuine substance was being done. Given the Kim Jong-il regime's odd world view based on its 
juche ideology, Pyongyang decided to maximize its leverage amidst the multiple pressures upon 
its American foes by upping the ante in the form of several cage rattling endeavors.  
From late 2002 through early 2003 North Korea consciously pushed the envelope. With one eye 
on the United States' decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, Pyongyang announced its plans 
to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, inflaming tensions surrounding its 
violations of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. Then, with an eye on the Bush 
administration's development of a controversial preemptive strategic doctrine that diminishes the 
United States' reliance on the principles of deterrence, Pyongyang claimed the same 
prerogative—stating "preemptive attacks are not the exclusive right of the United States." Also, 
knowing full well that the armistice that had halted the Korean War had an ambiguous legacy in 
South Korea and that South Koreans were still hopeful that an ROK-DPRK "Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges & Cooperation" (emphasis added) that went into 
effect in 1992 is fully viable, Pyongyang pushed the non-aggression pact theme vis-a-vis the 
United States. North Korea had to know this idea would resonate positively among South Korea's 
progressive leaders. Given the long-standing American aversion to unenforceable international 
agreements to outlaw war that American skeptics consider to be utopian, Pyongyang presumably 
knew this was a non-starter for the United States, but pushed it in order to embarrass Washington 
conservatives and complicate U.S. relations with Seoul's more idealistic liberal leaders.  
All of these maneuvers were compounded by a series of North Korean military provocations—
including violations of the DMZ air space, missile tests into the East Sea, and pursuit of a U.S. 
reconnaissance plane in international air space. Most observers of North Korea anticipate these 
military provocations will continue and may well be escalated. While it is clear that North Korea's 
approach to international affairs is motivated by its economic vulnerabilities that are undermining 
its strategic assets, those weaknesses do not prevent it from being a major threat to stability in 
Asia via such brinkmanship. As such it poses an enormous challenge to U.S. policy in the region. 
Arguably the greatest danger is North Korea's perception that contemporary U.S. strategic policy 
increasingly is in the hands of neo-conservatives who intend to deal with North Korea after 
achieving 'regime change' in Iraq—either by toppling the DPRK via sanctions or via preemptive 
military strikes aimed at eliminating its nuclear capabilities. The accuracy of this perception is 
debatable, but North Korean analysts who follow the American policy debate in the major media 
will have found prominent examples of U.S. neo-conservatives advocating a more assertive U.S. 
policy toward North Korea.[1] North Korean analysts of U.S. policy-making, who inform the views 
of their leaders in Pyongyang, cannot have missed the U.S. media's extensive coverage of 
American neo-conservatives' impact upon U.S. strategy toward Iraq. North Korean anxieties in 
that regard were unlikely to have been calmed by repeated reassurances from the White House 
that the United States "has no intention of invading North Korea." The more a ground force, 
conventionally armed "invasion" is disavowed, the more the North Koreans seem to be convinced 
the United States has other military plans for a preemptive attack. Although the details of this 
North Korean perspective have not received much attention in the United States, they have 
appeared in the press. The DPRK Foreign Ministry's Deputy Director, Ri Pyong-gap said—using 
the phrase noted above—"The United States says that after Iraq, we are next, but we have our 
own countermeasures. Preemptive attacks are not the exclusive right of the United States." And 
the KCNA, North Korea's news agency, noted "the U.S. intention to make a preemptive strike at 
[North Korea's] nuclear facilities." North Korea's perceptions of U.S. motives clearly are open to 
serious question because they may reflect the regime's paranoia, but that does not diminish their 
salience for the Northeast Asian threat environment. 
North Korea's perceptions of American motivations and U.S. strategic intentions toward the 
DPRK also should be taken more seriously because of the apparent impact they have had among 
South Koreans as a result of Pyongyang's appeals to pan-Korean solidarity. Although South 
Korean officials are well aware that North Korea long has sought to drive wedges between the 
United States and the ROK, and routinely discount such efforts, Pyongyang's recent appeals 
seem to be reaching a more amenable South Korean audience. Partly because of sporadic South 
Korean anti-American sentiments that feed ambiguity about U.S. interests regarding Korea, and 
partly because of South Korean unease about the Bush administration's usage of the "axis of 
evil" metaphor with attendant fears that the United States will successively pursue "regime 
change" in each member of the axis, North Korea's message is effective among a sizable 
proportion of South Koreans. Because of South Korean fears about the impact U.S. military 
action against North Korea almost certainly would have on the ROK, South Koreans have 
become more critical of what is perceived as a U.S. tendency toward unilateralism. Against this 
background South Korea's new president, Roh Moo-hyun, shortly before taking office observed 
"Koreans should stand together, although things will get difficult when the United States bosses 
us around." And, after he took office President Roh, as part of a campaign to encourage the 
United States to pursue a bilateral dialogue process with North Korea, urged the United States 
"not to go too far" in its pressures to resolve the nuclear problem. His Unification Minister, Jeong 
Se-hyun, elaborated on that approach when he asked "How can the U.S. ignore South Korea and 
go against our will in pursuing its North Korean policy?" 
Because of such anxieties about North Korea, and their ability to disrupt U.S.-ROK harmony, 
there is great risk that North Korea will try to take advantage of the United States being stretched 
thin during war in Iraq, by escalating its brinkmanship. Taking a provocative military step that 
could lead to a second front war may well be seen by Pyongyang as a way to compel the United 
States to negotiate bilaterally on North Korea's terms. Such circumstances could easily get out of 
control—escalating to a full scale war that could be far more daunting than the situation in Iraq. 
Pyongyang will not necessarily wait until the United States wraps thing up in Iraq and can turn its 
full attention—diplomatically or militarily—to North Korea. Although the United States seems 
poised to cope with more North Korean reckless brinkmanship in the heat of war with Iraq, 
Pyongyang may well take advantage of the United States being stretched thin to use its own 
preemptive preemption strategy. In this sense North Korea represents a profoundly serious threat 
to world peace. 
One way out of this potential disaster would be for the United States to recognize and accept the 
ways Pyongyang's bid for a bilateral dialogue process with Washington meshes with Seoul's 
objectives. South Korea's long-standing aspirations for regional multilateralism aimed at Korean 
reconciliation and reunification is predicated on providing North Korea with the same level of 
bilateral connections that South Korea has had for years as a result of the success of the ROK's 
late Cold War nordpolitik "cross recognition" plan. This enabled Seoul to use its newly established 
bilateral ties with China and Russia to reinforce its existing ties with the United States and Japan 
in order to strengthen multilateralism designed to induce moderation in North Korea. 
The origins of this evolving conceptual framework are significant for the current U.S. 
administration. This South Korean paradigm's roots are partially in the approach the previous 
Bush administration took toward post-Cold War limited multilateralism based on a foundation of 
bilateralism. That approach is what caused so much consternation for the Kim Dae-jung 
government when Henry Kissinger, in a March 2001 Washington Post column, advised the 
current Bush administration "Pyongyang must be convinced that the road to Washington leads 
through Seoul and not the other way around." Secretary Kissinger revived this approach in 
another Washington Post column after President Roh took office. This approach is contrary to 
how former President Kim and current President Roh Moo-hyun visualize achieving a positive 
U.S.-North Korea dialogue process intended to reduce tensions and encourage the DPRK to join 
in a multilateral engagement process designed to facilitate inter-Korean peaceful reconciliation. In 
short, a genuine solution may be "the other way around," despite President Bush's well intended 
emphasis on diplomatic multilateralism at his March 6 press conference.  
U.S.-North Korea bilateral negotiations can be integral to broader multilateral talks fostering 
tension reduction and inter-Korean reconciliation. North Korea continues to press for a non-
aggression pact from the United States, despite its 'poison pill' qualities among the intended 
American policy-making audience. Nonetheless, if one juxtaposes North Korea's desires for 
ousting a U.S. armed presence from Korea and American desires for eliminating North Korea's 
threat potentials—especially its weapons of mass destruction—these desires could be ground for 
a consensus providing a de facto security guarantee. In exchange for verifiable North Korean 
demobilization of most of its conventional forces and elimination of its WMD, the United States 
can offer reciprocal removal of all U.S. forces from Korea, enabling both sides to get what they 
want from each other. Equally important, such a bilateral exchange will incite mutual confidence 
building, facilitating North Korea's regime transformation within a multilateral effort to bring North 
and South Korea together en route to national unification. 
Instead of running the risks so apparent in the current environment, it would be much more 
prudent for the United States to innovatively utilize South Korea's approach to coping with North 
Korea. Rather than impeding our South Korean ally's diplomatic agenda in ways that aggravate 
anti-Americanism among South Koreans, it would be far better if Washington adopted Seoul's 
approach to defusing the current round of nuclear crises and treated U.S.-North Korean bilateral 
negotiations as part of the foundation for multilateralism intended to mitigate North Korea's threat 
potentials and be a catalyst for it to live in harmony with its neighbors. 
  
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our WMD Resources and East Asia Resources 
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